Suchergebnisse

Chapter 1 Introduction -- Chapter 2 Conservatism bias and asset price overreaction or underreaction to new information in a competitive securities market -- Chapter 3 Conservatism bias and asset price overreaction or underreaction to new information in the presence of strategic interaction -- Chapter 4 Representativeness heuristic and asset price overreaction or underreaction to new information in a competitive securities market -- Chapter 5 Representativeness heuristic and asset price overreaction or underreaction to new information in the presence of strategic interaction -- Chapter 6 The presence of representativeness heuristic and conservatism bias in an asset market -- Chapter 7 Conclusion -- Appendix -- References.

We propose an analytic account of dispositional conservatism that attempts to uncover a foundation of what is often taken to be an anti-foundationalist position. We identify a bias in favour of the status quo as a key component of the conservative disposition and address the question of the justification of such a conservative disposition, and the circumstances in which the widespread adoption of such a disposition might be normatively desirable. Our analysis builds on a structural link between the economist's traditional emphasis on questions of feasibility and the conservative's attachment to the status quo.

The study of ethics has recently become influenced by a form of moral conservatism—a critique of "modernity" with a bias towards Aristotle. It stresses the integrity of communities and their customs, a pluralistic and particularistic respect for the diversity of human groups, the poverty of utopianism and Marxism, and the inevitability of moral and political conflict. Each stress raises major issues: the priority of social goods over human rights; hermeneutical problems of understanding between communities; difficulties for societies' shaping a common future in accordance with their moral understanding; the balance between consensus and conflict in political life. These problems are addressed in an extended form of moral conservatism which defines a number of correspondences with progressive conceptions of humanity. Referring to central facts of moral psychology and possible institutions of public communication, the discussion identifies universal human purposes whose practical implications are consistent with a postmodern society in which the course of development is settled by public deliberation.

We decompose the market-to-book ratio into two additive components: a conservatism correction factor and a future-to-book ratio. The conservatism correction factor exceeds the benchmark value of one whenever the accounting for past transactions has been subject to an (unconditional) conservatism bias. The observed history of a firmś past investments allows us to calculate the magnitude of its conservatism correction factor, resulting in an average value that is about two-thirds of the overall market-to-book ratio. We demonstrate that our measure of Tobinś q, obtained as the market-to-book ratio divided by the conservatism correction factor, has greater explanatory power in predicting future investments than the market-to-book ratio by itself. Our model analysis derives a number of structural properties of the conservatism correction factor, including its sensitivity to growth in past investments, the percentage of investments in intangibles, and the firmś cost of capital. We provide empirical support for these hypothesized structural properties.

This research note engages the current research on measuring media bias. I present a reanalysis of the results found in Groseclose and Milyo (2005) and show that the original parameter estimates of the ideological positions of media outlets are not stable over time. Using the same data but analyzed over different periods of time, I find a different conclusion than the previous article. I examine four-year rolling time periods and find that the data produce different parameter estimates in the early- to mid-1990s as compared to after 2000, with all analyzed outlets appearing more moderate or conservative in later time periods. My results indicate that the estimated positions are sensitive observations in the data and the time period of observation of the outlet. Adapted from the source document.

According to the game-theoretic model of monetary policy, inflation is the consequence of time-inconsistent behavior of the monetary authority. The inflation bias can be eased by handing over the responsibility for monetary policy to an independent central bank and appointing a weight-conservative central banker. Countries around the world chose different combinations of central bank independence and conservatism. Most of the existing empirical studies concentrate on measuring legal or factual central bank independence thereby neglecting the degree of conservatism of the monetary authorities. In this paper we show how a joint empirical measure of central bank independence and conservatism can be derived from factual central bank behavior. Based on a panel logit approach we estimate measures of effective monetary policy conservatism for a sample of 11 OECD countries.

We use a simple, three-item test for cognitive abilities to investigate whether established behavioral biases that play a prominent role in behavioral economics and finance are related to cognitive abilities. We find that higher test scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test of Frederick (2005) indeed are correlated with lower incidences of the conjunction fallacy and conservatism in updating probabilities. Test scores are also significantly related to subjects' time and risk preferences. Test scores have no influence on the amount of anchoring, although there is evidence of anchoring among all subjects. Even if incidences of most biases are lower for people with higher cognitive abilities, they still remain substantial.